Lesson Learned

I learned that while being an E5 working in an E7/O2 slot for 6 months and then working in another E7 Slot until we redeploy as NCOIC of another section, and although my unit put me in for a BS, the NG unit above us does not believe E5's can get the award. They only authorizing units to put in BS, ARCOM, AAM. I'm max out already but it doesn't make much sense to me.

From the perspective of someone about to deploy again, I think a few lessons the Division learned are at risk for dying on the vine, or getting re-learned the hard way:

1. Iraq is not a poor country nor is it a “third world country”. If it is not worth it to the Iraqi Government to spend their own money on a project, it may not be worth spending ours. Too many Iraqis know that if they act helpless and incapable enough, we’ll lose patience and show up with lots of cash and/or contracts to do the job for them.

2. If we do decide Iraqis need American dollars--expenditure of CERP money on a very short term basis may be helpful. However, if the end state and objectives are not closely monitored, long term CERP expenditures creates dependency, promotes socialism (vs. capitalism), and resentment when we push Iraqis to adopt our projects and take over funding (when the funding stops, we get blamed and/or the local government we are trying to legitimize gets blamed—both are bad).

3. There is still a mentality among some in our unit that more projects with more American dollars equals greater success. True success is enabling inter-agency effort so that Iraqis received training on fiscal management, accounting, procurement procedures, and business management skills tailored to operate within their own systems. This way, they spend their own money, dedicate their own resources to projects they want vs. ones we think they need. CERP dollars that do not match or are not backed up by Iraqi money or “in kind” services on their own projects, risk being a waste. CERP projects that are not tied to promoting a “system of systems” approach also risk being a waste.

4. Whether focusing on developing economics of a nahia, qada, province etc, key aspects and indicators of the four following sectors should be focused on: consumers, producers, job market, and lending/borrowing institutions. Additionally, Any plan that is not tied in from the macro to the micro level risks a whole lot of mis-spent dollars.

5. Other Government Agencies do not have “deep pockets” as they seem to in JRTC rotations or in the minds of some. We (military) lose credibility if we find a shiny object (project we think Iraqis need), and expect “buy in” from other agencies. While OGAs are definitely interested in helping Iraq, they are looking at sustainability and all the factors listed in the previous bullets. Oh…and Iraqi “buy in” is a must…and a first. This is a lesson I think we learned early on.

6. Army has a “quick victory” mindset. PRTs have a long term strategy for development (or at least the good ones do). A lot of time and energy should be dedicated to meshing these two ways of thinking in order to combine efforts vs. stepping on each other.

7. One lesson not learned--Although it has been preached that we must take care of Families (we even went so far as to make it policy to spell them with a capital “F”), unfortunately most of us recognize this as lip service. The “train” during our final months is going about as fast as it can possibly run. Good Commanders are able to make the call when enough is enough and pull in the reigns. If not, (or if not supported by their higher Commander) ultimately it is our families who pay the price. Then we pay when our families have had enough and/or we grow apart to where we no longer know who they are.

Okay, I'll get to the point - we're not doing anyone any favors by promoting people early.

If there's one thing I learned is there is no substitute for experience - that is years served on the job in many different jobs learning ins and outs of staff work.

"Back in the Day" it took 12 years to make O4. Now they're supposed to be pinning at 9? All that gives us is senior O3s; or under-experienced O4s - take your pick. Those three additional years to cook - you know, develop a little... stew with your peers? Those were invaluable to me. As some of the staff began to melt away after January, there was an influx of new guys and newly promoted O3s that just weren't ready to handle the job of a "battle-major."

Oh, and being promoted below the zone a few times doesn't make you any smarter either. Just more smug and cocky of the abilities you have not had the time to develop yet. I think we all saw that manifest itself many times.

I know we're suffering a shortage of company and field grade officers right now, but we're fooling ourselves if we think promoting folks faster is the solution. They're just as dumb - just getting paid more for it.

(Moderator Comment: This post was editied in accordance with the blog posting policy)